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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
LARRY TREADWAY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
12812 
The defendant appeals his conviction for the crime 
of Unlawfully Possessing Marijuana for Sale. He was 
convicted in the District Court for the Third Judicial 
District in and for Tooele County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty of Unlawful Possession 
of Marijuana for Sale. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays that the judgment of the lower 
court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 10, 1971, two maids entered defendant's 
room at the Best Western Motel in Wendover, Utah. 
Eloise Lee, one of the maids, noticed a greenish broken 
up substance on the dresser. She was not absolutely cer-
tain as to what it was, but merely had an idea (T. 64). 
A third maid, Boby A vilos, entered the room and was 
asked by the other maids if she knew what the substance 
was (T. 64). Avilos said it looked like marijuana (T. 
69). Avilos had seen marijuana on approximately ten 
prior occasions (T. 70). 
Lynn Poulsen, the motel manager, went to the room 
and saw the marijuana (T. 75). He called Deputy Sher-
iff Marion Carter of the Tooele County Sheriff's Office 
and told him someone was using marijuana. Carter went 
to the motel around noon to talk with Poulsen. 
Late.- the same day, May 10, 1971, Carter went to 
the motel at about 4: 00 p.m., and at this time Carter and 
Poulsen entered the defendant's room. The purpose of 
this entrance was to determine if the defendant might 
be skipping out without paying his bill. Carter and Poul-
sen only went to the room to see if the defendant's per-
sonal items were still in the room (T. 8). As Carter en-
tered the room, he detected the odor of marijuana (T. 
Such an interpretation would effectually made a night 
... 
10). C::l:'tsr was in thz room for only 10-15 seconds (T. 
11); but Poulsen was in the room for approximately three 
to four minutes (T. 76). 
Be:~ause C'lrtef smelled marijuana \.vhen he entered 
the defendant's room, he continued surveillance of the 
area. Carter was also bothered by the fact that the de-
fendant didn't have enough money to pay for his motel 
room, yet he wanted to give his car away at any price 
and then buy another car and pay for it with cash (T. 
13, 14). 
Officer Carter called Fay Gillette of the Tooele 
County Sheriff's Office. Gillette advised Carter that he 
wanted a search warrant and that Carter should keep 
surveillance on the defendant (T. 11, 12). 
Officer Gillette obtained a search warrant. A search 
was made pursuant to the warrant and 42 kilos of mari-
juana were found in defendant's room (T. 101). 
Prior to trial, the defendant brought a Motion to 
Suppress evidence of the marijuana. The Court denied 
defendant's motion, finding the warrant was sufficient on 
its face (T. 58-59). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE 
SE ARCH WARRANT DOES ESTABLISH 
PROBABLE CAUSE UNDER BOTH UTAH 
AND FEDERAL LAW. 
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Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the St.ate 
of Utah provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
A renter of a motel room is protected from unreason-
able searches and seizures. However, a factor distinguish-
ing the present case is that all persons within defendant's 
room were there lawfully, and the search and seizure was 
done pursuant to a valid search warrant (T. 58-59, T. 54). 
Sheriff Gillette appeared before Judge Earl Marshall 
May 11, 1971, with an affidavit which clearly described 
the place to be searched: an apartment # 167, in Wen-
dover Best Western Motel, Wendover, Utah, and a 1961 
Black Jaguar, California license # YKH911. 
I terns to be seized were marijuana, drugs, and drug 
paraphernalia which might be used in committing a public 
offense. The affidavit states the cause for the warrant: 
1) Lynn Poulsen, a reliable informant and former Jus-
t'.cc of the Peace had personally observed marijuana in 
said apartment. 2) Surveillance of said apartment and 
automobile led to the belief thereby that drugs were con-
tained therein. 
Because of the disappearing nature of the property 
to be seized, the affidavit stressed the urgency of the 
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situation and requested that a day or night time search 
warrant be issued. Whereafter, Judge Marshall being 
satisfied that Sheriff Gillette's affidavit set forth suffi-
cient fads to establish probable cause, as provided in 
U taJ1 Code Ann. § 77-54-6. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-3 provides: "A search war-
rant shall not issue except upon probable cause . . ." It 
is the magistrate or the court who must be convinced of 
probable cause, and not the affiant. Allen v. Lindbeck, 
97 Utah 471, 93 P. 2d 920 (1939). 
Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P. 2d 242 (1943), 
discusses the essential information required in a suffi-
cient affidavit. The case states ~hat probable cause is 
established when an affidavit sets forth facts " ... suffi-
cient to cause a discreet and prudent man to believe that 
the accused had the property sought to be seized." Id. 
at 330. 
In determining what is probable cause for search, 
Utah looks to the weight of authority in Federal and 
state courts. Allen v. Lindbeck, supra. In Lindbeck, the 
court followed the majority view and stated that an af-
fiant's belief is not enough, but that an affidavit must 
contain facts upon which belief is based. This indicates 
that an affiant's belief, supported with an adequate reason 
for his belief, will constitute probable cause. 
The facts in the present case demonstrate that proba-
ble cause was established. Gillette's affidavit acknowl-
edged his awareness of defendant's possession of mari-
6 
juana, and then supports his belief with adequate reason. 
Gillette's infonnation crune from Lynn Poulsen, a fonner 
Justice of the Peace, and a reliable informant, who had 
lawfully been in defendant's room and observed the mari-
juana. It would be difficult to establish a stronger reason 
for probable cause than that of personal observation. Lynn 
Poulsen saw the marijuana, and knew that there was 
marijuana in defendant's room. 
State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P. 2d 517 
(1968), quotes the United States Supreme Court to illus-
trate the fundrunental precepts of a person's right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated 
* * *" had its origin as a safeguard against 
highhanded and ruthless intrusions against per-
sons, homes and property which had been perpe-
trated by officials of an oppressive government. 
No right-thinking person would desire to minimize 
or disparage the protections thus assured. But it 
is equally important that such protections be ap-
plied in circumstances they were intended to cover 
and that they do not become so extended beyond 
their reasons for being that even where there is 
no danger or likelihood of any such abuse, they 
provide a cloak of protection by which those en-
gaged in criminal activities may escape detection 
and punishment. The essential thing is to keep 
within the reasonable middle ground, between the 
protecting of the law-abiding citizenry from high-
handed or officious intrusions into their private 
affairs; and the imposing of undue restrictions 
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upon conscientious officers doing their duty in the 
investigation of crime. It was undoubtedly in an 
awareness of the desirability of avoiding the diffi-
culty just mentioned that the language of the 
Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches, 
but only those which are "unreasonable." Id. at 
518-19. 
Criscola, also illuminates upon the weighted balances 
to be used in establishing the validity of a warrant, and 
upon the advantages of a trial judge's position which en-
titles his determination to be clothed with propriety: 
The question to be answered is whether under 
the circumstances the search or seizure is one 
which fair minded persons, knowing the facts, and 
giving due consideration to the rights and inter-
ests of the public, as well as to those of the sus-
pect, would judge to be an unreasonable or oppres-
sive intrusion against the latter's rights. Due to 
the responsibility of the trial court in controlling 
the admissibility of evidence, and his advantaged 
position to pass on such matters, it is his preroga-
tive to make this determination. For those reasons 
his ruling should be indulged with a presumption 
of correctness, and should not be disturbed unless 
it clearly appears that he was in error. Id. 
Federal decisions demonstrate the essentials of proba-
ble cause. In declaring an unlawful search, Whitely v. 
Warden, 401 U. S. 560 (1971), held that a judicial officer 
must be supplied with sufficient information to support 
an independent judgment of pr~bablecausz-------
---~- -------- - -- ' -------- - . -----· '"' 
A recent case from the United States Supreme Court, 
United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 29 
8 
L. Ed. 2d 723 ( 1971) , clarifies many of the gray areas of 
search and seizure. Harris, involved a search warrant for 
illegal whiskey. The Court of Appeals reversed the con-
viction by relying on Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 84 
S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), in stressing that af-
fiant had never alleged that the informant was truthful, 
but only prudent, and on Spinelli v. United States, 393 
U. S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), in giving 
no weight to affiant's assertion concerning respondent's 
reputation. The Supreme Court then reversed the Court 
of Appeals and held that both the Aguilar and Spinelli 
tests had been met. Spinelli was satisfied because the 
affidavit related a personal observation of the informant. 
In Harris, the warrant was valid because the infor-
mation 'vas acquired in a reliable manner (personal ob-
servation), and the affidavit explained how the informant 
came by his information. The present case has a similar 
situation: Poulsen acquired the information in a reliable 
manner; he saw the marijuana and he knew there was 
marijuana in defendant's room (personal observation). 
Gillette's affidavit explains the reliable manner in which 
P0ulsen's information was acquired. 
Sheriff Gillette's affidavit does constitute probable 
c~.use for the issuance of a valid search warrant. 
A. 
PROBABLE CAUSE MAY BE ESTAB-
LISHED BY INCRIMINATING REPORTS 
FROM AN II':FORMER TO AN AFFIANT. 
(HEARSAY) 
Hc2.rsay is allowed on "reasonable grounds". Draper 
v. United States, .358 U. S. 306 (1959). 
Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960), is a 
Jnnclm<J.rk case shmving that hearsay will support probable 
ca.u~e. The affidavit in Jones recounted the tip of an 
anonymous informant who claimed to have recently pur-
chased narcotics from the defendant at his apartment, 
and described his apartment in some detail. Although 
the information in the affidavit was almost entirely hear-
say, the court concluded that there was "substantial basis" 
for crediting the hearsay. The informant had previously 
given accurate information; his story was corroborated by 
other sources; the defendant was a known user of nar-
cotics. 
Hearsay need not reflect the direct personal observa-
tions of affiant so long as the magistrate is informed of 
the underlying circumstances used in arriving at the con-
clusions. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102 
( 1965) . And courts should not interpret the affidavits 
in a hypertechnical manner, but with common sense. Id. 
In Aguilar, supra, an affidavit based solely on hearsay 
was found insufficient because there was no information 
presented to the magistrate to enable him to evaluate 
the informant's reliability or trustworthiness, The affi-
davit in Aguilar failed because it was a mere affirmance 
of the informant's suspicion or belief. Harris, supra, at 
10 
578. The two pronged test for hearsay in Aguilar, is de. 
scribed in Spinelli v. United States: 
"While recognizing that the constitutional re-
quirement of probable cause can be satisfied by 
hearsay information, this Cowi held the affidavit 
inadequate for two reasons. First, the application 
failed to set forth any of the 'underlying circum. 
stances' necessary to enable the magistrate inde-
pendently to judge of the validity of the inform. 
ant's conclusion that the narcotics were where he 
said they were. Second, the affiant-officers did not 
attempt to support their claim that their inform-
ant was 'credible' or his information 'reliable'." Id. 
at 412-13. 
Even though an affidavit is entirely hearsay, there 
may be a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. 1 
Harris at 581-82. 
An important factor in validating the warrants in 
both Jones and Harris arose from personal observation: 
"The affidavit in the present case, like that in 
Jones, contained a substantial basis for crediting 
the hearsay. Both affidavits purport to relate the 
personal observations of the informant - a factor 1 
that clearly distinguishes Spinelli ... " Id. 
Poulsen's reliable personal observation of marijuana is 
enough for a magistrate to independently conclude that 
there was marijuana in defendant's room. 
The Sheriff's surveillance substantiates reliability. 
In United States v. Evans, 447 F. 2d 129 (1971) a post 
office was burglarized. No one saw the crime committed, 
but three residents saw the vehicle at the scene of the 
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crime at the time of the crime. The affidavit contained 
names and description. The warrant was held valid be-
cause the three separate witnesses substantiated relia-
bility. 
A Utah case, similar to the present case, upheld the 
warrant and recognized the use of hearsay. State v. 
Smelser, 23 Utah 2d 347, 463 P. 2d 562 (1970). In Smelser, 
the court said that the facts in the affidavit may be stated 
on information and belief. Smelser also stressed the avoid-
ance of a "hypertechnical" interpretation of the wording 
of an affidavit so as not to destroy content or efficacy. 
In acceptance of two of the leading hearsay cases, foot-
note # 4 of Smelser reads: 
Jones v. U. S., 362 U. S. 257, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. 
Ed. 2d 697 (1960). See also U. S. v. Ventresca, 
380 U. S. 102, 85 S. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684 
(1965), where the following affidavit was held 
sufficient: "Based upon observations made by 
me, and based upon information received officially 
from other Investigators attached to the Alcohol 
and Tobacco Division assigned to this investiga-
tion, and reports orally made to me describing the 
results of their observations and investigations, 
this request for the issuance of a search warrant 
is made." Id. at 564. 
Utah will accept hearsay in establishing probable cause. 
The affidavit does not indicate that Gillette's beliefs 
are based on hearsay upon hearsay. With regard to the 
hearsay rule, Gillette and Carter may be deemed as one 
person since they were officers working together in the 
l~ 
couxse of duty. But even if the affidavit did contain hear-
say upon hearsay, Rule 66 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure allows hearsay upon hearsay in situations 
v.rhcre hearsay is pe1missible. 
"It will not do to say that warrants may not issue 
on uncorroborated hear0ay." Harris, supra, at 584. The 
hearsay in Gillette's affidavit is founded upon a substan-
tial basis and does establish probable cause. 
B. 
THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTS THE AFFI-
ANT'S CLAIM THAT POULSEN IS CREDI-
BLE AND HIS INFORMATION RELIABLE. 
The affidavit states an exact description of defen-
dant's automobile and room. It states that the initial 
source of information was Lynn Poulsen, a reliable inform-
ant and a former Justice of the Peace; that acting upon 
Paulsen's information a surveillance of the said apartment 
and automobile was conducted, and that said surveillance 
corroborated Paulsen's information in confirming affiant's 
belief that drugs were contained in said apartment. 
Probable cause is established by Paulsen's personal 
observation, coupled with confirming observations during 
surveillance. Draper, supra. Results from surveillance 
substantiate reliability. United States v. Evans, supra. 
Paulsen's declaration against his own interest further sub-
stantiates his information. Harris, supra. Such stated 
facts may be stated on information and belief. State v. 
Smelser, supra. 
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In Harris, the court declared that it never suggested 
that a previous reliability was necessary. The crux of the 
issue is whether the informant's present information is 
truthful or reliable. Because Poulsen was a former Jus-
tice of the Peace, his credibility, reliability, and loyal past 
record of local law enforcement sustain his veracity. In-
fonnants who arc reputable citizens, not seeking immunity 
or any other reward, are not subjected to the same degree 
of reliability as professionals or those seeking immunity. 
This is the holding of such cases as People v. Gwubman, 
485 P. 2d 711 (Colo. 1971), and the recent case of the 
Virginia Sup:.:eme Court, Guzewicz v. Commonwealth, 
decided l\!Iarch 6, 1972, reported in part in 10 CrL 2486. 
The very averments which appellants tend to thrust 
upon this court by means of HYPERTECHNICALITY 
are attacLcd heavily in Harris: 
"Indeed, it emphasized that the affiant had never 
alleged that the informant was truthful, but only 
'prudent,' a word that 'signifies that he is circum-
spect in the conduct of his affairs, but reveals 
nothing about his credibility.' 412 F. 2d, at 797-
798. Such a construction of the affidavit is the 
very sort of hypertechnicality - the 'elaborate 
specificity once exacted under common law' -
condemned by this Court in Ventresca. A police-
man's affidavit 'should not be judged as an entry 
in an essay contest,' Spinelli, supra, at 438 (Fortas, 
J., dissenting), but, rather, must be judged by the 
facts it contains." Harris, supra, at 579. 
By viewing the present facts in light of Harris's com-
mon-sense and realistic fashion, the affidavit easily sup-
14 
ports a magistrate's independent and reasonable conclu-
sion that Poulsen is credible, and his information reliable. 
c. 
THE AFFIDAVIT IS SUFFICIENT BE-
CAUSE IT ALLEGES WHEN THE OFFENSE 
OCCURRED. 
The information given in Sheriff Gillette's affidavit 
meets the time requirement. The sufficiency of the time 
requirement depends on the circumstances and the con-
text in which the statement is made. 
"Such a statement as to the time of the al-
leged offense must be clear and definite, although 
exactly when this requirement is met depends on 
the circumstances and the context in which the 
statement is made." Annot., 100 A. L. R. 2d 527. 
Cases have taken different approaches in satisfying 
the time element. People v. Warner, 221 Mich. 657, 192 
N. W. 566 (1923), did not require an allegation as to time. 
A present tense in the affidavit may be sufficient. Han-
son v. State, 55 Ok. Crim. 138, 26 P. 2d 436 (1933). The 
word 'recently' may suffice. Douglas v. State, 144 Tex. 
Crim. 29, 161 S. W. 2d 92 (1942); Waggener v. McCan-
less, 183 Tenn. 258, 191 S. W. 2d 551 (1946). In Jones, 
the words "on many occasions" was considered enough 
to fulfill the time requirement. 
Probable cause is more effectively justified when the 
time of the application for the warrant is closer to the ' 
time of the acquired information. Franklin v. State, 437 
15 
s. W. 2d 260 (Tenn. App. 1968). Sheriff Gillette applied 
for the search warrant within 24 hours from when he re-
ceived the information, and during the time the apart-
ment was still under surveillance. 
The affidavit lists the date of the request for the 
warrant, the date of the signature, the date and time the 
affidavit was prepared, and the date and time Sheriff 
Gillette received his information from Carter and Poulsen. 
The information received from Carter and Poulsen are 
impliedly stated in the affidavit to be RECENT. Gillette's 
acute awareness of time is recorded throughout the affi-
davit. He states that he fears the drugs will become non-
existent through destruction; that the aforementioned 
property should be seized as soon as possible; and that 
the urgency of the situation requires a night time warrant 
to be issued. The criticalness of time is so acute in Gil-
lette's mind that he is worried about hours rather than 
days; hence, the affidavit even accounts for the valuable 
time utilized in preparing the affidavit: 
"the elapsed time reflected herein has been dili-
gently utilized by your affiant in the mechanics of 
physically preparing these documents, locating and 
consulting with County Attorney Edward A. Wat-
son, of this County, in reference to the aforemen-
tioned preparation; locating the appropriate magis-
trate; and transporting these documents to the 
magistrate for his official action in connection 
therewith." 
The affidavit adequately describes Sheriff Gillette's 
concern. He is in a position where he knows there is mari-
16 
juana in defendant's apartment. Defendant is in a room 
under very transient circumstances, and the Sheriff fears 
that if the illegal property is not apprehended within 
hours it may become non-existent. 
A distinguishing factor from the cases cited in appel-
lant's brief arises out of the permanency of the defen-
dant's abode. The affidavits in each instance indicated 
that the defendants were not in transient circumstances. 
Two of the three cases involved permanent living condi-
tions, and the third involved a motel room in which the 
defendant had been obseived on numerous occasions. 
As cited by appellant, Dean v. State, 242 So. 2d 411 
(1970), indicates that the court is not as concerned about 1 
the date as it is the type of information contained in the 
affidavit: 
" . the affidavit is deficient because it fails to 
show that information received from the informant 
was fresh as opposed to being remote." Id. at 411. 
See also State Ex Rel. v. Attorney General, 237 So. 2d 
640 (Ala. 1970). Gillette's affidavit clearly indicates that 
the information is fresh and not too remote. 
In State v. Kelley, 99 Ariz. 136, 407 P. 2d 95 (1965), 
a warrant was held valid on grounds similar to Waggner 
v. McCanless. The court in Kelley stated: 
Certainly if the informant 'recently' received or 
obseived the facts sworn to by the affiant, then 
the requirement that the affiant state the date as 
to when he received his information is also met. 
Id. at 99. 
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This indicates that the date upon which the affiant re-
ceived his information will be sufficient. Gillette's affi-
davit satisfies the time requirement. 
In resolving the issue of probable cause, a court would 
do well to follow the advice of a recent United States 
Supreme Court decision, United States v. Ventresca, 380 
U.S. 102 (1965): 
"The Fourth Amendment's commands, like all con-
stitutional requirements, are practical and not ab-
stract. If the teachings of the Court's cases are 
to be followed and the constitutional policy served, 
affidavits for search warrants, such as the one in-
volved here, must be tested and interpreted by 
magistrates and courts in a common sense and re-
alistic fashion. They are normally drafted by non-
lawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal in-
vestigation. Technical requirements of elaborate 
specificity once exacted under common law plead-
ings have no proper place in this area. A grudg-
ing or negative attitude by reviewing courts to-
ward warrants will tend to discourage police offi-
cers from submitting their evidence to a judicial 
officer before acting." 
POINT II. 
THE SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED FOR A 
DAY OR NIGHT TIME SEARCH IS VALID 
ON ITS FACE. 
Section 77-54-11 Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides: 
The magistrate must insert a direction in the 
warrant that it be served in the daytime, unless 
the affidavits are positive that the property is on 
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the person or in the place to be searched; in which 
case he may insert a direction that it be served at 
at any time of the day or night. 
Sheriff Gillette's affidavit states three times that 
there is marijuana in defendant's room. " ... on oath ... 
says that l1.e has and there is probable and reasonable 
cause to believe, and that he does believe, that there is 
now in the premises ... " Sheriff Gillette knew there were 
drugs in defendant's room, and he had to seize said illegal 
drugs before they were disposed of. In the urgency of 
time, Sheriff Gillette requested a night time warrant in 
the event circumstances would prevent him from serving 
said warrant before nightfall. 
Gillette's affidavit meets the averred criteria of posi-
tiveness: 
"The rule requires averments of facts suffi-
ciently persuasive to support a reasonable infer-
ence that the property is in fact on the premises. 
A more rigid construction would require proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the property is in 
the place to be searched. Such a construction 
would enable the criminal to completely conceal 
an illegal enterprise behind an insurmountable 
barrier, provided, of course, he pursued it only at 
night. * * *" Stewart v. People, 419 P. 2d 
650 (Colo. 1966), at 653. 
In construing positiveness, the court said it is relevant 
to consider that said property was found at the place to 
be searched. Id_ See also Annot., 26 A. L. R. 3d 943. 
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The meaning of positiveness has its limits. An affi-
davit made on infonnant's infonnation and affiant's be-
lief will satisfy probable cause for a night time search 
warrant. United States v. Tolomeo, 52 F. Supp. 737 (D. 
C. 1943) . "If personal knowledge of the affiant is required 
few search warrants would authorize a night search." Id. 
at 738. Observations of a person other than affiant may 
support a night time search warrant. United States v. 
Plemmons, 336 F. 2d 731 (6th Cir. 1964). 
The word "positive" in § 77-54-11 is not indicative of 
a knowledge beyond all aboslute universal flawlessness. 
Such an interpretation would effectually make a night 
time warrant completely unattainable to police officers 
who are fighting the evils of crime. Pre-trial events must 
deal with common sense and probable cause in a realistic 
fashion. The standard to be proven is not to reach a level 
beyond all reasonable doubt: 
Trials are necessarily surrounded with evidentiary 
rules "developed to safeguard men from dubious 
and unjust convictions." ... But before the trial 
we deal only with probabilities that "are not tech-
nical; they are the factual and practical considera-
tions of everyday life on which reasonable and 
prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Harris, 
supra, at 582-83. 
More important, the issue in warrant proceedings 
is not guilt beyond reasonable doubt but probable 
cause for believing the occurrence of a crime and 
the secreting of evidence in specific premises. Id. 
at 584. 
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The warrant in People v. Carminati, 236 N. Y. S. 2d 
921 (1962), was insufficient because it lacked the details 
which Gillette's affidavit contains. In Carminati, the 
court was looking for the following details: 
"The affidavit upon which the search warrant was 
issued contains no facts whatever from which the 
issuing Magistrate could find probable cause for 
believing that the warrant could not be executed 
in the day time or that the property sought to be 
seized would be removed or destroyed if not seized 
forthwith." 
Sheriff Gillette's affidavit is distinguished from Carminati 
because Gillette's affidavit did show probable cause, and 
an entire paragraph was written to demonstrate the poten- 1 
tial need for a night time search. Gillette's affidavit may 
be distinguished from United States v. Raide, 250 F. 
Supp. 278 (N. D. Ohio, 1965). Gillette's belief is tanta-
mount to a high degree of certainty, and he explains the 
critical importance of the underlying circumstances which 
were left out in Raide: Poulsen saw marijuana in defen-
dant's room; Poulsen is a credible and reliable informant; 
surveillance confirmed Poulsen's report. 
Sheriff Gillette had strong reason to be convinced of 
the later proven fact which demonstrated that defendant 1 
did have marijuana in his room, and Gillette's affidavit 
supports this conclusion. At the time of its issuance, the 
night time search warrant was legally acceptable and an 
essential for public protection. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that Sheriff Gillette's affidavit 
clearly establishes probable cause for the issuance of a 
warrant to search for the 42 kilos of marijuana located 
in defendant's room which were to be used in committing 
a public offense. 
The affidavit gives positive reasons for believing mari-
juana was located in defendant's room, and justifies a 
night time warrant in order to prevent defendant's wrong-
ful abuse of society. 
In view of the foregoing argument substantiating 
these points, appellant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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